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Data, Trade, and Growth
Michael Mandel
Progressive Policy Institute
The architecture of the Internet is designed as a “network of net-
works.” As such, one of its key attributes is making the passage of data 
from one network to another easy. So when a user sends an e-mail, 
views a video, or downloads a fi le from a Web site, the data may pass 
through a large number of different networks on the way from its origin 
to its destination, with the routing virtually invisible to the user. This 
architecture has proven to be extremely fl exible and powerful, both 
nationally and globally. People and businesses with Internet access can 
easily get data of all sorts from around the world. Similarly, companies 
can effi ciently and cheaply provide services such as e-mail and Web 
search on a global basis, in many cases without charge. 
One sign of the Internet’s global success is this: the rapid growth of 
cross-border data fl ows. Cross-border data fl ows are growing far faster 
than conventionally measured trade in goods and services. According 
to TeleGeography, a consulting fi rm that keeps track of international 
data fl ows, demand for international bandwidth increased at an annual 
rate of 49 percent between 2008 and 2012 (TeleGeography 2012). By 
comparison, the overall volume of global trade in goods and services, 
adjusted for infl ation, rose at an annual rate of 2.4 percent over the same 
period.
Looking at the data links between the United States and Europe in 
particular, the data-carrying capacity of transatlantic submarine cables 
rose at an average annual rate of 19 percent between 2008 and 2012. 
Meanwhile, the overall volume of trade in goods and services between 
the United States and Europe, adjusted for infl ation, is barely above 
prerecession peaks.
Indeed, the global economic and fi nancial system, as it stands 
today, would not function without cross-border data fl ows. Data fl ows 
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that cross national borders are essential to almost everything: manufac-
turing supply chains, global fi nance, international medical and physics 
research, entertainment, tourism, education, social media, and commu-
nity. Indeed, cross-border data is becoming increasingly important as an 
input to production, and as a crucial element for economic growth. “The 
cross-border free fl ow of information enables international trade which 
can lead to increased innovation, productivity, and economic growth,” 
writes Meltzer (2013, p. 11) in a paper from the Brookings Institution. 
Moreover, trade in data creates positive externalities and gives 
an extra boost to global growth. Unlike exports of goods, data can be 
shipped from one country to another without depriving the fi rst country 
of the benefi ts. All other things being equal, growth in cross-border data 
fl ows can be a far more powerful impetus to consumer welfare and eco-
nomic growth than growth in trade in goods and services. 
However, despite the importance of cross-border data fl ows, cur-
rent international economic statistics are mostly uninformative and 
even misleading about their magnitude. First, note that cross-border 
data fl ows are not tracked as a separate category in the trade statistics. 
Instead, cross-border trade that involves data is lumped in with trade in 
services. For example, international telecommunications are treated as 
the export/import of a service. The World Trade Organization (WTO) 
estimates that global exports of telecommunications services totaled 
$111.5 billion in 2012 (WTO 2013). 
But treating cross-border data as a service creates the real problem: 
By international agreement among statistical agencies, the export or 
import of services is defi ned to occur when there is a monetary payment 
from a resident of one country to a resident of another in exchange for 
the service. For example, if a U.S. business hires accountants in Lon-
don, that becomes an export of accounting services from the United 
Kingdom to the United States. 
Virtually all of the existing statistics about cross-border trade in data 
are based on this monetary defi nition of service exports and imports. The 
July 2013 report from the United States International Trade Commis-
sion, Digital Trade in the U.S. and Global Economies, Part 1, identifi es 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the U.S. Census Bureau, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
and Eurostat as the main sources for statistics on “digital trade.” Each of 
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these relies on the same basic defi nition of service exports and imports 
as being tied to a monetary exchange between residents of two differ-
ent countries (U.S. Internationl Trade Commission 2013, Table 4.2, p. 
4.24). Currently, international agencies such as the International Tele-
communications Union (ITU) only collect fragmentary statistics on 
cross-border data fl ows, though they are putting more effort into esti-
mating such fi gures (see, for example, ITU [2012]).
I will show in this chapter that the effi cient global architecture of 
the Internet allows and even encourages data to cross national borders 
without leaving a signifi cant monetary footprint. As a result, economi-
cally important cross-border data fl ows are simply not being counted 
by current international economic statistics. I will offer evidence in this 
chapter that both the level and rate of growth of data trade are being 
signifi cantly understated. 
This understatement has serious policy implications. First, the data 
sector is a bigger contributor to U.S. and global growth than current 
economic statistics show. Second, to the degree that trade negotiators 
prioritize their goals according to the relative magnitude of different 
trading sectors, trade policy should place more emphasis on maintain-
ing the free fl ow of data. Similarly, international tax policy should place 
more emphasis on maintaining the free fl ow of data. 
Third, attempts by various countries to implement barriers to the 
free fl ow of data may do considerably more economic damage than the 
current trade statistics show. This is especially important in the wake 
of recent revelations about the extent to which the National Security 
Agency (NSA) has monitored data fl ows around the world. This news 
has caused a rising demand within countries such as Brazil for certain 
data to be kept within national borders—so-called data localization or 
data protectionism. The European Union is also considering new data 
privacy regulations that could potentially act as an impediment to fl ows 
of data in and out of the EU. 
Finally, it’s becoming clear that better statistics about cross-border 
data fl ows are needed to convince policymakers of how important data 
is to economic health. That might help avoid trade and tax policies that 
are detrimental to growth. It is self-evident that good policy rests on 
a foundation of accurate and comprehensive knowledge about current 
and emerging trade fl ows. 
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HOW CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS ARE
MEASURED TODAY
The WTO and national statistical agencies such as the BEA regu-
larly produce fi gures on cross-border trade in data-related services such 
as telecommunications services, computer and information services, 
and fi nancial services. Table 9.1, below, shows the reported dollar value 
of global exports of selected data-related services (WTO 2013).
According to international standards, trade in services is typically 
measured by monetary transactions between residents of one country 
and residents of another country. That’s the main principle laid out in 
the Manual on Statistics of International Trade in Services, approved in 
2010 by the United Nations Statistical Commission: 
The market price is used as the basis for valuation of transactions 
in international trade in services. Market prices for transactions are 
defi ned as amounts of money that willing buyers pay to acquire 
something from willing sellers. The exchanges are made between 
independent parties and based on commercial considerations only 
and are sometimes called ‘at arm’s length’ transactions. (United 
Nations 2011, p. 34)
Similarly, the BEA—the statistical agency in charge of tracking 
service trade—measures data-related exports and imports by tracking 
Table 9.1  Reported Global Exports of Selected Data-Related Services, 






Communications services (both voice 
and data)
111.5 3.4
Financial services 303.1 0.3
Computer and information services 
(including Web search)
262.7 7.2
Royalties and license fees 289.6 5.9
Sum of selected data-related services 966.9 4.0
Merchandise exports 18,401.0 3.3
SOURCE: WTO (2013).
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the money received from “foreign persons” and the money paid to “for-
eign persons.” 
The BEA collects much of its data on service sector exports and 
imports through surveys: specifi cally the BEA Benchmark (BE-120) 
and Quarterly (BE-125) Surveys of Transactions in Selected Services 
and Intellectual Property with Foreign Persons (BEA 2011). Table 9.2 
shows the fairly long list of service and intellectual property export 
transactions that are covered in the benchmark survey. The list of 
service and intellectual property import transactions is similar, while 
the quarterly survey covers a similar but slightly shorter list of traded 
services. Many of these include cross-border data fl ows such as tele-
communication services, royalties and license fees, database and other 
information services, and fi nancial services.
These surveys feed into the widely cited monthly report “U.S. 
International Trade In Goods and Services,” including the goods and 
services trade defi cit, which is a key number for economists in govern-
ment and the private sector. In addition, the BEA produces an annual 
report on trade in services. Table 9.3 shows statistics on exports for 
selected data-related services in 2012. 
THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE INTERNET AND
DATA TRADE
The fi gures in the previous section raise two disturbing questions. 
First, when measured as a service, the rate of growth of the cross-border 
data-related services is barely higher than the growth rate of merchan-
dise trade, both for the globe and for the United States. Second, the 
aggregate numbers make cross-border data trade look relatively unim-
portant. For example, reported U.S. telecom exports of $14 billion in 
2012 are roughly the same size as U.S. exports of newsprint. (Box 9.1 
explains how international phone calls are treated in the trade statistics.) 
The global and national statistics on trade in services are based on 
tracking monetary exchanges between residents of different countries. 
In theory, this principle can be applied to trade in data as well. If a per-
son in the United States downloads a fi le from a Web site in a different 
country, it’s theoretically possible that he or she could be charged both 
up15shmg20ch9.indd   267 2/17/2015   1:24:47 PM
268   Mandel
Types of export transactions
Receipts for intellectual property
Rights related to industrial processes and products
Rights related to books, music, etc.
Rights related to trademarks
Rights related to performance and events prerecorded on motion picture fi lm and TV 
tape (include digital recordings)
Rights related to broadcast and recording of live events and performances
Rights related to general use software
Business format franchising fees
Other intellectual property
Receipts for selected services
Accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services
Advertising services
Auxiliary insurance services
Computer and data processing services
Data base and other information services
Educational and training services
Industrial engineering services
Industrial-type maintenance, installation, alteration, and training services
Legal services
Management, consulting, and public relations services (including expenses allocated 
by a U.S. parent to its foreign affi liates)
Merchandising services
Operational leasing services
Trade-related services, other than merchandising services
Performing arts, sports, and other live performances, presentations, and events
Research and development services
Telecommunications services
Agricultural services
Disbursements to fund production costs of motion pictures
Disbsursements to fund news-gathering costs and production costs of program 
material other than news
Waste treatment and depollution services
Other selected services
SOURCE: BEA Form BE-120: “Benchmark Survey of Transactions in Selected Ser-
vices and Intellectual Property with Foreign Persons,” p. 6, http://www.bea.gov/
surveys/pdf/be120.pdf (accessed December 2013).
Table 9.2  Selected Service and Intellectual Property Export
Transactions Tracked by BEA Survey BE-120
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for the cross-border telecommunications link and for the content in the 
fi le. 
However, in practice the architecture of the Internet has developed 
in such a way that many or perhaps most cross-border data fl ows do not 
result in an exchange of money between residents of different countries. 
Let us illustrate this important point with a simple example: an Ameri-
can economist who visits the Web site for the Bank of Russia (www
.cbr.ru) and wants to obtain statistics about the latest movement of the 
Russian monetary supply. 
First, imagine that these statistics were in bound volumes that had 
to be shipped from Moscow. There’s little doubt that the cost of the 
volumes and the shipping would be quite high and would register as 
imports in the trade statistics. 
But when the data is downloaded, there is no charge for content. The 
Russian central bank is not charging U.S. economists for downloading 
data. So if this cross-border data transfer is going to create a monetary 
footprint and show up in the BEA statistics, it will happen because 
the telecommunications transport across national borders involves an 
exchange of money between a U.S. resident and a non–U.S. resident. 
Obviously, the economist or his or her institution pays a domestic 
Internet service provider such as Comcast or Verizon for an Internet 
connection. But unlike an international phone call, no extra money is 
paid for the foreign Web site. The data request is passed from network 
Table 9.3  Reported U.S. Exports of Selected Data-Related Services, 




Annual growth rate, 
2008–2012 (%)
Communications services (both voice 
and data)
14.0 8.8
Financial services 76.4 4.9
Computer and information services 
(including Web search)
17.3 7.2
Royalties and license fees 124.2 5.0
Sum of selected data-related services 231.9 5.3
Goods exports  1,536.0 4.3
SOURCE: BEA international services statistics, Table 1: “Trade in Services, 1999–
2012.” http://www.bea.gov/international/xls/tab1a.xls (accessed December 2013).
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Box 9.1  The International Phone Call and Foreign Trade
Historically the major cross-border data fl ow was the conventional 
international phone call. In the United States, the originator of an interna-
tional phone call picked up a telephone, dialed 011, then the country code 
and phone number, and paid an international charge to his or her phone 
company. The provider then paid the carrier in the receiving country ac-
cording to a government-mandated settlement schedule. Conversely, the 
recipient of an overseas call did not pay an international charge—instead, 
the overseas caller paid the local provider in his or her own country, who 
settled up with the U.S. phone company. 
Under this scheme, calls from the United States to overseas points were 
classifi ed as imports, because the foreign carrier received the payments. 
Calls from other countries were classifi ed as exports, since the payments 
came to the U.S. carriers. So if U.S. customers made more overseas calls 
than they received, the telecom trade balance would be negative. Indeed, 
that was true for many years. According to an FCC report from 1998, “U.S. 
carriers owe settlement payments for the services that they bill, and are 
owed payments for the services that the foreign carriers bill. In addition, 
U.S. carriers are owed payments for switched traffi c that transits U.S. 
points. Because U.S. customers place far more calls than they receive and 
because U.S. carriers terminate more collect calls that generate surcharges 
for the originating carrier, U.S. carriers make net settlement payments to 
most foreign carriers. The total net payment for all U.S. carriers grew from 
$0.4 billion in 1980 to $5.6 billion in 1996” (Blake and Lande 1998).
Reading this explanation, however, should make it clear that this 
defi nition of telecom imports and exports is an artifact of a regulatory con-
vention that “calling party pays” for wireline calls. Suppose instead that 
we had a rule that “receiving party pays,” as in a collect call or an 800 
number. Under that alternative regulatory regime, the toll on an outgoing 
international call would be collected from the recipient of the call by his 
or her (foreign) carrier. The foreign carrier would then remit a portion of 
the charge to the originating domestic carrier. As a result, with “receiving 
party pays,” an outgoing international call would be treated as an export. 
Similarly, an incoming call would be treated as an import. Thus, a shift in 
regulatory conventions from “caller pays” to “recipient pays” would im-
mediately turn a telecom trade defi cit into a trade surplus, without altering 
the fi nal allocation of revenues to the respective telecom carriers after the 
settlement process. In addition, outgoing and incoming international calls 
are physically indistinguishable, in terms of the equipment used. 
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to network until it reaches the Russian central bank, which then sends 
the money supply fi gures back again. At some point, that data request 
passes from a U.S.-owned network to a foreign-owned network. For 
the sake of clarity of the example, let’s assume that the U.S.-owned net-
work also owns the submarine cable between New York and the United 
Kingdom, so that the interchange between the U.S.-owned network and 
the foreign network physically occurs in the UK.1
Is there an exchange of money between the U.S-owned and the 
foreign-owned network? Now we have to delve into the architecture 
of the Internet. Networks are connected in two ways, by peering or 
by the payment of transit fees. Peering is an agreement between two 
networks to exchange traffi c without exchanging money. Peering agree-
ments, especially between large networks, are so ubiquitous that they 
are basically conducted on a handshake, as one authoritative OECD 
study shows: “A survey of 142,000 peering agreements conducted for 
this report shows that the terms and conditions of the Internet inter-
connection model are so generally agreed upon that 99.5 percent of 
interconnection agreements are concluded without a written contract” 
(Weller and Woodcock 2013, p. 3).
In fact, the largest global networks—the so-called ‘Tier 1’ net-
works—almost by defi nition peer with every other Tier 1 network. That 
means if a data packet goes from AT&T’s network to British Telecom’s 
on the way from Russia, it is unlikely that money changed hands at the 
interconnect between the two. 
It might seem as if peering is a barter-type agreement that should 
generate revenue recognition on the fi nancial books, even if no money 
changes hands. However, peering takes place mostly in situations of 
balanced traffi c, so the revenues and costs would net out. The account-
ing fi rm KPMG notes that, “in our experience, peering arrangements 
between Tier 1 telecoms do not result in the recognition of revenue even 
though a service is provided and value is transferred between telecoms 
in much the same way as under traditional interconnect arrangements” 
(KPMG 2010, p. 30).
It’s worth noting that peering is a key reason that you can access 
Web sites from all over the world without having additional charges 
added to your Internet bill. 
Alternatively, smaller networks can connect to larger ones by pay-
ing transit fees—also known as buying Internet transit. In theory, these 
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Internet transit payments could show up as trade in telecommunications 
services if the smaller network was paying a provider from a different 
country for transit. However, the price of Internet transit has been drop-
ping sharply. According to the market research fi rm TeleGeography, the 
price of IP transit at major hubs has dropped by roughly 30 percent a 
year over the past fi ve years (TeleGeography 2013). To my knowledge, 
no statistical agency currently uses the price of Internet transit to adjust 
service trade. 
ESTIMATING ONE COMPONENT OF DATA TRADE
For the reasons described in the previous section, we would expect 
that the offi cial statistics on cross-border data trade (trade in data-related 
services) far understate both the actual economic value and the growth 
of cross-border data fl ows. But how big is the understatement? 
In this section I will try to answer one small piece of this ques-
tion. In particular, we will delve deeper into the measurement of U.S. 
telecom exports and construct an alternative estimate based on directly 
measuring cross-border data fl ows. For 2012, the BEA reports that 
exports of communications services from the United States amounted 
to $14 billion (payments from nonresidents to residents). Imports of 
communications services into the United States amounted to $8 bil-
lion (payments from residents to nonresidents). These numbers have 
been rising, but they are still minuscule compared to the importance 
and amount of international data traffi c in and out of the United States. 
However, a closer look helps explain why these have to be under-
statements. Let’s start with a simple example. Suppose a major U.S. 
telecom provider builds its own submarine cable to Great Britain, say, 
or Singapore. That expenditure will show up in the company’s capi-
tal spending budget, rather than as a payment for cross-border telecom 
services. Then, if the U.S. provider peers with foreign providers at the 
non-U.S. cable landing, no money will change hands at the connection 
point. The result: The telecom provider has made a major investment in 
providing cross-border data fl ows, none of which show up in the trade 
account. The export benefi ts of capital investment by the telecom indus-
try are not being counted. 
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More generally, most submarine cables are being built these days 
by a consortium of companies, each of whom gets access to a share of 
the bandwidth. The same principle shows up as in the previous exam-
ple—the spending on the cable appears as a capital investment, rather 
than as a payment for cross-border telecom services. From here, we 
can construct increasingly complicated examples that arrive at the same 
place—cross-border transport of data without a corresponding mon-
etary transfer between residents and nonresidents. 
How can we construct a better estimate of cross-border telecom 
services? In an earlier paper, I discussed the idea that the production 
and use of data should be treated as a fundamental component of eco-
nomic activity, parallel to the production and use of goods and services 
(Mandel 2012). This approach leads naturally to an increased focus on 
directly measuring data generation, data fl ows, and data storage as a 
way of understanding economic activity.
One pioneer in such efforts has been Martin Hilbert, who has been 
developing a systematic methodology for comparing the communi-
cations capacity of various media, ranging from mobile to television 
(Hilbert and López 2011). Based on this work, the International Tele-
communications Union (ITU) has been gradually moving toward direct 
measures of data fl ows, as opposed to indirect measures such as number 
of cellular subscriptions or broadband connections. A recent publica-
tion from the ITU notes,“Using the unifying metric of bits per second, 
employed for measuring global technological capacity to communi-
cate, it is possible to compare different communication technologies. 
It is also possible to analyse bits per second per capita, per technology, 
per country, or per any other relevant socio-economic or demographic 
parameter” (ITU 2012, p. 167).
This section follows in the same spirit of direct measurement of 
data fl ows. For the purposes of this section, data fl ow is measured in 
terabits per second (Tbps). The telecommunications market research 
and consulting fi rm TeleGeography estimates that the United States had 
23 Tbps of international Internet capacity in 2012, with an average utili-
zation of 29 percent and a peak utilization of 49 percent.2 This suggests 
that, on average, the U.S. cross-border data fl ow is roughly 6.7 Tbps.3
Is this volume of cross-border data a large number or a small num-
ber? I compare the cross-border data fl ow with a recent Cisco Systems–
sponsored projection of data traffi c, by country and type (Cisco Sys-
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tems 2013).4 For 2012, the Cisco study estimates Internet and IP traffi c 
in the United States at 8 exabytes per month and 13 exabytes per month, 
respectively.5 That translates into roughly 26.5 Tbps and 42.2 Tbps.6
Table 9.4, below, compares the U.S. cross-border data fl ows with 
the overall U.S. Internet and IP traffi c. I fi nd that cross-border data 
fl ows are roughly 25 percent and 16 percent of U.S. Internet and IP traf-
fi c, respectively. To put this in perspective, U.S. exports of goods and 
services are 14 percent of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) in 2012, 
while U.S. imports of goods and services are 18 percent of U.S. GDP in 
2012. (Box 9.2 briefl y reports similar calculations for Europe.)
This calculation offers us a reasonable way of estimating the size 
of the international component of the U.S. telecom sector. According to 
the BEA (2014), the gross output for the telecommunications industry 
in 2011 was $556 billion. After adjusting for growth, that puts the gross 
output at roughly $575–$600 billion in 2012. 
If we assume that the international component of the telecom 
industry is proportional to the size of the data fl ow, the international 
component of U.S. telecom would be roughly $92–$150 billion. That’s 
compared to the $14 billion in exports and $8 billion in imports that the 
offi cial statistics report. 




International Internet capacity connected to the U.S. 23.0
Average utilization (%) 29.0
Average cross-border data fl ow 6.7
(average international traffi c)
All U.S. Internet traffi c 26.5
All U.S. IP traffi c 42.2
Average U.S. cross-border data fl ow as a percentage of:
All U.S. Internet traffi c (%) 25.0
All U.S. IP traffi c (%) 16.0
SOURCE: International capacity and utilization estimates from TeleGeography (2014). 
Traffi c estimates from Cisco. IP includes both Internet traffi c and managed IP such as 
consumer video. Figures omit mobile.
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Obviously, this should be viewed as an exploratory effort, with 
plenty of caveats. However, the revised estimates intuitively make more 
sense than the offi cial statistics, in terms of measuring the importance of 
cross-border telecom services. Of course, these numbers are accompa-
nied by substantial and worrisome caveats, as well as the possibility of 
large errors in both directions. In particular, these include the following:
• Coverage and methodology may differ. Cisco’s projections 
include all IP usage. TeleGeography’s estimates of interna-
tional capacity by country do not include private networks such 
as intracorporate networks, Google and other content provid-
ers’ networks, and research networks. This factor would tend to 
underestimate the share of cross-border traffi c. 
• Double-counting is inevitable. International Internet traffi c 
is often routed through third-party countries before getting to 
its destination. Traffi c between Moscow and New York might 
be routed through London and therefore show up as part of 
European cross-border data fl ows. Traffi c between the Cana-
dian cities of Vancouver and Toronto might be routed through 
the United States and therefore show up as part of U.S. cross-
border data fl ows. And since less-developed countries may have 
Box 9.2  Europe’s Data Connections
Using a similar methodology as for the United States, we can calcu-
late interregional cross-border data fl ows as a share of Internet traffi c for 
Europe. TeleGeography estimates that international bandwidth in Eu-
rope was 56.5 Tbps in 2012, but that 78 percent of that bandwidth was 
between cities in the same region. As a result, “interregional Internet 
capacity connected to Europe” equaled 12.6 Tbps in 2012. Based on this 
fi gure, we calculate that cross-border data fl ows between Europe and the 
rest of the world equaled 16 percent of the region’s Internet traffi c and 
13 percent of the region’s IP traffi c. 
These results, which should be viewed as highly imprecise and ten-
tative, suggest that the United States is more interconnected with the rest 
of the world than Europe. The sources of error enumerated in the caveats 
above are potentially very signifi cant. 
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better Internet connections with the United States and Europe 
than with each other, it’s possible for intra-African traffi c, say, 
to be routed through New York or London. This factor would 
tend to overestimate the share of cross-border traffi c.
• When comparing estimates/forecasts from different 
sources, timing matters. International Internet capacity, as 
estimated by TeleGeography, has been growing at almost 50 
percent per year. Domestic U.S. Internet traffi c, as projected by 
Cisco, has been growing roughly as fast. As a result, calculat-
ing cross-border data fl ows as a share of Internet traffi c can be 
heavily infl uenced if one source is using yearly averages while 
the other source (TeleGeography) is using a particular point in 
time (April of each year). The direction of bias is uncertain.
• Compression may distort the statistics. Widespread and 
growing use of compression means that “we communicate 
around three times more information through the same installed 
infrastructure as we did in 1986” (Hilbert 2011, p. 7). It’s pos-
sible that cross-border data fl ows may be compressed more 
intensively than purely domestic data fl ows. 
MEASURING THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF
CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS
Why are we concerned with correctly measuring cross-border data 
fl ows? The classic justifi cation for the benefi ts of trade is that two or 
more countries working together can produce more than the same coun-
tries operating separately. Moreover, the size of the gain from trade is 
related to the magnitude of trade, all other things being equal. The more 
trade, the better. 
Under the current trade statistics, the magnitude of trade in data is 
being systematically underestimated. Thus, the benefi ts from trade in 
data are being systematically underestimated as well, which, as we will 
see in the next section, distorts policy decisions. 
Moreover, trade in data has somewhat of the characteristic of a pub-
lic good, since data can be duplicated relatively costlessly. As a result, 
up15shmg20ch9.indd   276 2/17/2015   1:24:48 PM
Data, Trade, and Growth   277
the fact that the data is created in one country and used in another 
country does not deprive the fi rst country of the use. To give a spe-
cifi c example, one type of intangible capital stock is “entertainment, 
literary, and artistic originals,” including fi lms. Licensing the right to 
show a fi lm in a foreign country currently shows up as an export in the 
national income accounts. However, such a license generally does not 
reduce the ability of American consumers to view the fi lm, and it does 
not reduce the intangible capital stock of “entertainment, literary, and 
artistic originals.” 
As a result, trade in data creates positive externalities and an extra 
boost to global growth. Unlike exports of goods, data can be shipped 
from one country to another without depriving the fi rst country of the 
benefi ts. All other things being equal, growth in cross-border data fl ows 
can be a far more powerful impetus to consumer welfare and economic 
growth than growth in trade in goods and services. This means that data 
trade generates a positive externality for the global economy. If a U.S. 
university produces educational videos about computer science and 
makes them available on the Internet, then students around the world 
can benefi t from those videos. 
Now we turn to the question of how data trade fi gures into calcula-
tions of GDP and economic growth. As noted in an earlier paper, data 
can be “consumed” by individuals; can be used as an intermediate input 
into production; and can be an investment in intangible capital (Mandel 
2012).
For trade in conventional goods and services, there is a well-
established methodology for assessing such trade’s contribution to eco-
nomic growth. In the calculation of GDP, the dollar value of exports is 
a plus, while the dollar value of imports is a minus. For the calculation 
of gross domestic purchases—which are one measure of living stan-
dards—the dollar value of exports of goods and services is a minus, 
while the dollar value of imports of goods and services is a plus. 
The arithmetic does not work quite the same for cross-border data 
fl ows, for two reasons. First, because data that are exported are still 
available domestically, exports don’t need to be subtracted from gross 
domestic purchases. Second, imports of data potentially come in at low 
or zero prices, as discussed above, despite the fact that there is a posi-
tive price to originally producing the data and then transporting it across 
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national borders. As a result, imports of data, valued in dollars, appear 
not to contribute to growth. 
Consider, however, that the alternative to importing the data at a 
low or zero price is to produce it domestically at its full cost, which 
would be higher than the import price. Viewed from that perspective, 
there is a growing body of literature about how to value the contribu-
tion to growth of imports that are priced much lower than comparable 
domestic products. I will show how this approach can be used to value 
cross-border data fl ows.7
To demonstrate how this would work, I will consider the amus-
ing category of YouTube videos of cats involved in different activities 
(Illustration 9.1). Quite a few of these videos are produced in Japan and 
get millions of free views (Lewis-Kraus 2012). They provide pleasure 
for viewers in America and around the world—in that sense they are 
analogous to going skiing or reading a book. Thus, they raise consumer 
welfare in the United States for people who enjoy videos of cats. But 
how should the gain to the U.S economy from these “free” data fl ows 
be measured? The key is to realize that there are two relevant prices 
here. One is the price to Americans of consuming the Japanese-made 
cat video, which is zero. The second is the maximum price, Pcat, that an 
American would pay for viewing a Japanese-made cat video, measured 
either in dollars or in value of time. We assume that there is no way 
of profi tably producing a comparable video with Japanese cats in the 
United States—in other words, in order for someone in this country to 
produce comparable videos domestically, the videos would have to be 
sold at an average price per viewing in excess of Pcat.
So before YouTube, it was as if the price of a Japanese cat video to 
Americans was equal to Pcat, and the volume of videos viewed was zero. 
After the Internet and YouTube, the price P of Japanese cat videos goes 
to zero, and the volume of videos viewed goes to V. 
How much does this change contribute to U.S. gross domestic pur-
chases? For the sake of simplicity, assume that X is the size of gross 
domestic purchases in dollars, excepting cat videos. Let’s also assume 
that there is no infl ation and that X is otherwise not changing. Then the 
straightforward way of calculating growth would be as (X + P × V)/X, 
where P is the price of a cat video after the introduction of YouTube. 
But P is zero, so it looks like there is no gain. 
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In fact, a better approach is roughly analogous to the procedure 
used to calculate chain-weighted GDP growth. I take the geometric 
average of two growth rates—the fi rst assuming that the price of the 
video is always zero, and the second assuming that the price of the 
video is always Pcat : 
 .
In other words, the gain to gross domestic purchases from cross-
border data fl ows of cat videos is roughly equal to the revenue that 
would be generated by pricing the videos at the average of the actual 
price (zero) and the price that Americans would be willing to pay, Pcat. 
Illustration 9.1  Maru the Cat, as Seen on a YouTube Video from Japan
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Since this requires no additional domestic resources, it is also the gain 
to consumer welfare. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Trade in data is fundamentally a new phenomenon. While many 
people would like to fi t it into the framework of previous trade deals—
in particular, the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS)—such efforts will not work. We need new analytical tools to 
deal with both measuring cross-border data fl ows and assessing the 
benefi ts. 
This chapter has made the case that, without those tools, the eco-
nomic impact of cross-border data fl ows is being understated. What 
effect does this understatement have on trade and tax policy?
Trade and Tax Policy 
Both trade and tax policy require a series of compromises and 
trade-offs. In the case of trade negotiations, a wide variety of different 
industries and interests—agriculture, low-tech manufacturing, high-
tech manufacturing, fi nance, insurance—are competing for the atten-
tion of policymakers. Trade negotiators have to decide which issues are 
“must-haves” and which ones they can retreat on. 
Similarly, tax policy requires balancing out the need to raise rev-
enue against the negative effect of taxes on different industries. That’s 
especially true in today’s climate, where tax cuts benefi ting one indus-
try will have to be balanced by closing tax loopholes or raising taxes on 
other industries. 
Policymakers and negotiators make these decisions partly by 
assessing political reality and partly by assessing economic strength. 
All other things being equal, industries that have a bigger positive effect 
on jobs and growth will fare better in trade and tax policy. 
The problem is that the positive benefi ts of cross-border data 
fl ows—because they are such a new phenomenon—are signifi cantly 
underestimated in the available offi cial statistics. Reported exports of 
data-related services show up as relatively minor in the larger picture. 
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Under the circumstances, the impact of cross-border data fl ows on eco-
nomic growth will be understated as well, and it will be more diffi cult 
for policymakers to set the right priorities for trade and tax policy. 
There have been several recent proposals for increasing the tax rate 
paid by international Internet companies, or for imposing additional 
regulations on them. In one instance of this, a recent paper from the 
French government suggested a sort of tax on data (Collin and Colin 
2013). Such proposals—which would be likely to discourage cross-
border data fl ows—are more likely to be seriously considered in the 
absence of evidence showing the large positive economic impacts from 
such cross-border data fl ows. 
Impact of Data Localization 
Another example comes from the aftermath of the revelations about 
NSA monitoring, which created a backlash against U.S. Internet compa-
nies and intensifi ed discussions about building “walls” that would keep 
certain types of personal data from leaving countries such as Brazil. 
Several reports have identifi ed the possible negative economic 
consequences of such actions (Castro 2013a,b; Staten 2013). However, 
what’s missing is the ability to actually track the negative consequences 
from data protectionism, since we do not currently track cross-border 
data fl ows. By comparison, if a country erects trade barriers against a 
particular tangible product, the impact of such a policy would immedi-
ately show up in the trade statistics. It’s diffi cult to measure the harm 
from barriers to data trade if we cannot measure the data fl ows to begin 
with. Weller and Woodcock (2013) note that adverse effects may be 
incidental:
It is also the case that regulations that are not explicitly intended 
to apply to Internet traffi c exchange may have that effect. For ex-
ample, restrictions on the ability to export certain data, such as 
customer profi les, intended to protect security and privacy, may 
also limit the development of Internet topology and the growth 
of Internet assets in some regions. Similarly, tax policies in each 
country toward broadband and Internet businesses are likely to af-
fect the choice of the locations for investment in Internet assets. 
(p. 24)
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CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR BETTER DATA ON
CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS 
Businesses in any industry are usually ambivalent about the collec-
tion of government statistics on that industry. On the one hand, objective 
industry-wide statistics can be extremely useful for business decision-
making and planning. On the other hand, the collection process can be 
intrusive, and accurate statistics can potentially attract new competitors 
or unwanted attention from regulators. 
The calculation gets even tougher for rapidly innovating tech 
industries. Tech companies are unlikely to call for additional invest-
ment in statistics that may be quickly rendered obsolete by technologi-
cal change. 
However, the balance changes in a situation where businesses need 
government support in order to avoid bigger problems. In particular, 
better information about cross-border data fl ows will help make the 
case that data protectionism and taxes on data can be economically 
destructive. 
T he bottom line is that the statistical agencies should supplement 
the current trade statistics with additional metrics on cross-border data 
fl ows. This should be part of a large push to better measure data con-
sumption and investment domestically. 
Notes
My thanks to the Sloan Foundation for funding this research. I thank Diana Carew of 
the Progressive Policy Institute, Alan Mauldin of TeleGeography, Steve Bauer and Bill 
Lehr of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Michael Kende of Analysis Ma-
son for very useful assistance. All mistakes and errors are my own.
1. Many large providers own their own undersea cables, have a share of a cable, or 
have long-term rights to use part of the bandwidth. Submarine cable is used to 
carry cross-border data fl ows across oceans but also often between countries on 
the same continent, because it’s often easier and safer to maintain cables that run 
along the coast underwater than across diffi cult terrain. Cables are typically laid 
with multiple strands of optic fi ber, some of which are “lit”—i.e., they have the 
necessary equipment to be used—and some of which are “dark,” or not yet ready 
for use. Capacity can be increased by laying new cables, by lighting dark fi ber, or 
by improving the capacity of already-lit fi ber. 
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2. I thank Alan Mauldin of TeleGeography for providing these estimates. 
3. These fi gures are based on the bidirectional averages of the average for the month 
of April and the peak during April of each year.
4. See also http://ciscovni.com/forecast-widget/index.html.
5. Non-Internet IP traffi c in the United States is mainly consumer video. 
6. 1 exabyte = 1,024 petabytes; 1 petabyte = 1,024 terabytes; 1 terabyte = 8 terabits.
7. This growing body of literature on how to assess growth when import prices are 
less than domestic prices includes Diewert and Nakamura (2010) and Feenstra et 
al. (2009). 
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